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Abstract—RGB cameras are arguably one of the most relevant 
sensors for autonomous driving applications. It is undeniable 
that failures of vehicle cameras may compromise the 
autonomous driving task, possibly leading to unsafe behaviors 
when images that are subsequently processed by the driving 
system are altered. To support the definition of safe and robust 
vehicle architectures and intelligent systems, in this paper we 
define the failures model of a vehicle camera, together with an 
analysis of effects and known mitigations. Further, we build a 
software library for the generation of the corresponding failed 
images and we feed them to the trained agent of an autonomous 
driving simulator: the misbehavior of the trained agent allows a 
better understanding of failures effects and especially of the 
resulting safety risk.  
Keywords—autonomous driving; RGB camera; failures 
model; driving simulation; image-based applications 
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous driving is attracting growing attention in 
recent years, with ever-increasing demand and investments 
from the industry [17]. The objective of an autonomous 
driving system is to drive by itself without requiring help from 
a human: the vehicle detects the environment, locates its 
position, and operates to get to the specified destination safely. 
Sensor technology, data-fusion and inference algorithms 
as Artificial Intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) 
applications are the enabling technologies that play a 
cornerstone role in autonomous driving systems. These are 
involved in the majority of the essential tasks for safe driving 
such as sensor-fusion, environment representation, scene 
understanding, semantic segmentation, tracking, object 
detection and recognition [15]. Amongst sensors, the RGB 
(red, green and blue) camera is acknowledged as the most 
commonly used and an irreplaceable one [15]. Despite 
cameras have the known disadvantages of strong sensitivity to 
external illumination and limited field of view, visual 
recognition systems are amongst the most solid applications 
of autonomous driving  [33]. Vehicle cameras are already 
exploited in many applications such as traffic sign recognition, 
lane detection, obstacle detection, etc. [15], [16], [17]. 
Additional prospective applications are being researched; for 
example, at intersections, knowing the location of pedestrians 
and bicyclists can allow the car to make sophisticated 
precedence decisions [16]. Also, cameras are amongst the 
cheapest solutions to build autonomous driving systems that 
are capable of sensing the surroundings [17].  
When the images provided by the camera are degraded, 
fatal accidents may occur. The trained agents of the AI/ML 
applications responsible for the elaboration of inputs may rely 
on biased data and consequently lead to wrong (unsafe) 
decisions.  
A considerable amount of works explored how to make 
the trained agents robust to artificially crafted or accidentally 
manipulated input images [35], [36], [37], and how to secure 
a camera from direct attacks that may disrupt the proper 
behavior of the camera itself [18], [19]. However, few or no 
works focused on the attentive identification of a realistic and 
complete set of accidental modifications of images from a 
failed RGB camera. To the best of our knowledge, existing 
works consider a credible set of image alterations but without 
a systematic analysis of what are the possible malfunctions of 
a camera and consequently without a shared failures model 
and software libraries for its reproduction.  
We observe that cameras failures and their effects on the 
overall system should be systematically studied to fully 
understand the resulting safety threats at system-level, and 
possible mitigations should be identified carefully. Such study 
would benefit system and software engineers, both for 
architecting of system and for robustness assessment of 
image-based AI/ML applications. 
 From the above statement, the contribution of this paper 
are defined as follows: i) we create and discuss a failures 
model for vehicle cameras in the domain of autonomous 
driving, by analyzing the different failures, their causes and 
their effects on the system, ii) we review existing mitigations 
at component-level, iii) we reproduce the failures effects on 
the produced image through software; iii) we confirm the 
effects and discuss the associated safety risks using as 
reference an application for autonomous driving. Technically, 
we achieve these contributions respectively through: i) the 
definition of an FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, 
[14]) on the components of an RGB camera, assuming the 
camera is placed in a vehicle, and an attentive literature 
review; ii) the development of a failure library in Python, that 
we made publicly available in [9], to alter images according 
to the failures model; and iii) the injection of failures in the 
frontal camera of a vehicle simulated in the Carla autonomous 
driving simulator [1], where the trained agent from [3] is 
running. This last item allows discussing the misbehavior of 
the trained agent, mainly in terms of number of collisions. 
Most noteworthy, we prove that even camera failures which 
slightly alter the image may deceive the trained agent, and in 
a way dependent on weather conditions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II 
we present the fundamentals that are at the basis of our work. 
In Section III we detail the identified failures of camera 
components, their effects on the output image, and possible 
mitigations. In Section IV and Section V respectively we 
implement the failures model in a set of Python modules, and 
we inject them in the camera of a simulated vehicle, showing 
their impact and analyzing failures risks. Finally, in Section 
VI we discuss related works and in Section VII we summarize 
the paper contribution and we define our future works. “© 20XX IEEE.  Personal use of this material is permitted. 
Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any 
current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this 
material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new 
collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or 
reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.”
II. BACKGROUND NOTIONS 
We present background notions that are at the basis of our 
work. In Section II.A we define the architectural structure of 
an RGB camera (simply called camera, from now on) that we 
use as reference in our work, and in Section II.B we describe 
the FMEA methodology that we apply to identify camera 
failures. 
A. Architecture of a Camera 
We consider a camera structured in five components 
(Figure 1): lens, camera body, Bayer filter, image sensor and 
ISP (Image Signal Processor) [27]. These five components 
contribute to the creation of the output image. 
Lens. Photographic lenses are devices capable of collecting 
and reproducing an image [7]. The lens is the component that 
has the greatest impact on the quality of the images. The 
photographic lens can be composed of one or more lenses 
and/or reflectors as systems of concave and convex mirrors, 
often also combined with diopters. The fundamental factor 
that distinguishes one lens from another is primarily the focal 
length, which allows dividing them into macro categories. A 
second factor that characterizes the lens is brightness. A third 
distinguishing factor are macros: a macro lens has the ability 
to focus from infinity to 1:1 magnification that is, the size of 
the image in real life is the same size as it is reproduced on the 
sensor. Another relevant factor is the focus: this can be manual 
or automatic. The lens also contains a minimum of electronics, 
necessary for the focus motor (when automatic) and for 
zooming [20], and also they may or may not be stabilized. 
Camera Body. The camera body is the container of all the 
electronics of the camera. The Bayer filter, the image filter and 
the ISP are here contained. Typically, the functions of the 
camera body are securing the device and protecting inner 
components from exposure and contact with the outside. For 
example, the case protects the sensor from light and other 
possible sources of damage. 
Bayer Filter. The Bayer filter (or Bayer pattern) is a scheme 
for the arrangement of elements sensitive to different colors 
layered above sensors, that is used for the acquisition of digital 
images [71]. The photodiodes in an image sensor are color-
blind by nature: they can only register shades of gray. To 
obtain the color in the image, they are covered with different 
color filters: red, green and blue (RGB) according to the model 
designated by the Bayer filter. This filter groups the sensors 
for the three fundamental colors RGB in cells of 2x2 
photosites: each cell contains two green elements, one red 
element and one blue element (Figure 2). Each pixel is filtered 
to register only one of the three colors: to obtain a color image, 
various demosaicing algorithms can be used that interpolate a 
set of complete red, green and blue values for each pixel. 
These algorithms use the surrounding pixels to estimate the 
value for a particular pixel [70].  
Image Sensor. The image sensor is the transducer that 
converts the image into its representation or electrical coding. 
Essentially, it is a silicon chip capable of capturing and 
measuring light i.e., the quantity of photons which reach the 
chip. The sensor generally has a rectangular shape and 
typically small dimensions, which vary from manufacturer to 
manufacturer and from model to model. The sensor surface is 
made up of millions of tiny receivers arranged in a regular 
grid. These receivers, also called photosites, are the 
microsensors that carry out the conversion from photons to 
electrons. 
Each individual receiver is able to supply an electrical charge 
proportional to the number of photons that hit it. The detected 
charge is then converted by a special analog-digital 
conversion circuit into a numerical value. Each of the values 
obtained from the photosites will constitute a pixel of the 
obtained image. There are currently two types of image 
sensors on the market: CCD (Charge Coupled Device) and 
CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide Semi- conductor). Both 
are based on the concept of converting the charge of each 
photosites into a digital format using an ADC (Analog to 
Digital Converter), but differ in how the information is 
processed. In fact, for CCD sensors, the information on the 
charge is taken from the photosites row by row and stored in 
a register whose content is passed to an amplifier and 
subsequently to the ADC. After the row has been fully 
processed, it is eliminated from the exit register and the next 
row that undergoes the same treatment is loaded. Instead in 
CMOS sensors, together with photosites a series of transistors 
have also been integrated which perform an amplification and 
conversion of the charge into voltage. Using a matrix 
structure, it is possible to individually select each photosites 
through its [row, column] coordinates, and then send the 
voltage to an ADC that performs the conclusive digital 
conversion [6], [42]. 
ISP. The Image Signal Processor is a type of specialized 
media processor or Digital Signal Processor (DSP), used for 
image processing in digital cameras as well as other devices 
[42]. Its functions are multiple and fundamental for the final 
result after a first acquisition of the image, such as: 
demosaicing, correction of the image sensor, noise reduction, 
image sharpness correction, resizing the image, lens distortion 
correction, chromatic aberration correction, image 
compression and JPEG encoding, video compression, audio 
processing / compression / encoding and more [42].  
Figure 1. A camera and its components: Lens, and the Camera Body 
composed of Bayer filter, Image Sensor, Image Signal Processor. 
 
 
Figure 2. Scheme of a Bayer filter. On the left, a sample cell of 2x2 
photosites. In digital imaging, a color filter array (CFA), or color filter 
mosaic (CFM), is a mosaic of tiny color filters placed over the pixel sensors 
of an image sensor to capture color information [41]. 
 
B. Principles of FMEA 
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA, [14]) is a 
widely-used reliability management technique designed to 
identify potential failures of a component or a process, 
understand the effects of these failures, assess the risk 
associated with these failure modes and ultimately classify 
problems in terms of importance [4]. This failure 
identification allows to choose and implement corrective 
actions to address the most serious potential failures. Usually 
performed analytically, an FMEA is composed of four stages 
[4], [5]: i) identify all known or potential failure modes of a 
system; ii) confirm the causes and effects of each failure; iii) 
rank the recognized failures by their risk, defined as a 
combination between the probability of occurrence of a failure 
and the severity of the latter; iv) take remedial actions for the 
highest risky failures. 
The assumption underlying the application of the FMEA 
is the principle according to which the risk is related not only 
to the probability that a failure occurs, but also the seriousness 
of its consequences and ability to avoid or mitigate it. 
Ultimately, FMEA provides a knowledge base of the failures 
model and information on corrective actions that can be used 
as a resource for future troubleshooting activities [4], [5], [14], 
which matches the objectives of our work and it is the reason 
why this technique was selected.  
III. ANALYSIS OF CAMERA FAILURES 
We consider a frontal camera of a vehicle organized in the 
five components discussed in Section II.A, and we assume 
that output images are then processed by image-based AI/ML 
applications. We exercise the FMEA on the components of the 
camera. The application of the FMEA identifies the failures 
model of the camera components, the cause of such failures, 
and their resulting effect at camera-level i.e., on the output 
image. Further, we complement this list with a literature 
review on camera failures, to assure that no relevant failure 
modes are left out. With respect to the usual analytical 
application of FMEA, due to the absence of reference data, we 
could not associate credible ratings on the risk matched to the 
individual failures (this is in-line with acknowledged 
limitations of risk ratings in FMEA [4]). However, we 
mitigate this gap through Section IV and Section V, via 
simulations of the identified failures. 
In Section III.A we list the failures in alphabetic order; we 
assign an evocative name to each failure, that we will use in 
the rest of the paper. In Section III.B we summarize the 
failures and we report mitigations from the state of the art. 
A. List of identified failures 
Banding. In this failure, many parallel horizontal lines in 
the background are visible in the produced image. The lines 
are more visible when looking at the darker colors, although 
they can be also perceived on the lighter ones. Another type 
of banding can be seen on images where the plain background 
color degrades, from the point of view of tones, in lighter 
colors: this is typically called dithering [59]. Figure 3 shows 
the Banding failure injected into Figure 4a. Only a portion of 
the banded image is shown, to make the banding effects 
clearly visible to the naked eye. Banding failures manifest in 
the image sensor.  
Black, White (brightness). These failures represent the 
brightness alteration, from its minimum (black image) to its 
maximum (white image) limits, that can happen with the 
breakdown of fundamental components of the lens such as the 
shutter, the diaphragm or the iris  (Figure 4b). For example, if 
the shutter has a malfunction that does not allow the entrance 
of the correct amount of light through the lens, brightness 
could be altered, from entirely black to entirely white. These 
brightness failures manifest in the lens component. 
Blurred. Blur may occur if the image captured by the 
device is not in focus (Figure 4c) [69]. Especially in 
autonomous driving, it is of fundamental importance that the 
    
       
           a) Original frame: no failures                          b) White (brightness)                              c) Blurred                                           d) Broken Lens 
        
                e) Condensation                    f) Dead Pixel(s) (two black lines are drawn)     g) Dirty Internal-External                                h) Ice 
        
             i) No Bayer Filter                             j) Chromatic Aberration - blur           k) No Demosaicing             l) No Noise Reduction 
Figure 4. Output frames of the frontal camera for 11 of the different failures of the camera components.  
The failures are applied to a frame acquired from the frontal camera of the Carla [1] autonomous driving simulator. 
 
Figure 3. Example of banding: vertical and horizontal lines are introduced 
captured images are of good quality and therefore in focus. 
This is clear if we think that the image-based AI/ML 
applications make decisions regarding the vehicle's 
movement, based on the information content of the camera 
images. Blurred failures manifest in the lens component. 
Brackish/Salt-Water. The brackish phenomenon is 
common in coastal areas and puts a strain on the durability of 
the materials if not treated with suitable products and/or not 
maintained over time [6]. The corrosive power of water and 
air given by the substantial percentage of salt may damage the 
lens and also the camera body itself, to the extent that external 
agents may enter the circuits [43]. In the worst scenario, this 
can affect image acquisition. The image may be altered in 
various ways; we refer to the description of all the other 
failures effects for  a complete characterization of 
Brackish/Salt-Water effect. This failure manifests in the lens 
and camera body. 
Bright Lines. This failure is rather rare with the current 
knowledge and technology. The produced images could show 
bright vertical and/or horizontal lines, also clearly 
distinguishable with the naked eye. The cause of these lines is 
due to the use of LIDARs: this  laser technology emits a light 
intensity (not visible to the human eye) that can seriously 
damage the camera’s image sensor. This failure may manifest 
in the image sensor. 
Broken Lens. One or more internal or external lenses may 
break, for example because of mechanical stresses due to 
vehicle jolts or the impact with gravel throw-up by the tires of 
nearby vehicles.  The camera regularly outputs the image, but 
it will include one additional line (in case of a scratch) or more 
complicated patterns (Figure 4d), and obviously in case no 
further components breaks because of the mechanical stress. 
This failure manifests in the lens component. 
Broken VR. In this case, the malfunction of the 
component that deals with the reduction of vibrations (VR) is 
considered. This is located in the lens and it is common on 
many camera models. Its malfunction causes out of focus 
images: for this reason, the effects of this failure are similar to 
the Blurred ones. Broken VR manifests in the lens component. 
Condensation. When the outside air temperature drops 
sharply, condensation may appear on the lenses. 
Condensation, or humidity, degrades the images (Figure 4e) 
and, if it penetrates inside the device, also the electronical 
parts [72]. The image is acquired in the correct way, but each 
image may have heavy changes due to halos on the lenses 
[72]. If humidity penetrates inside the camera body, it may 
cause malfunctions and it may also preclude the entire 
operability of the device. Condensation failure manifests in 
the lens and camera body. 
Dead Pixel. In this failure, the output images have one or 
more defects of a pixel size. We call this failure Dead Pixel, 
because it has the same visual effect of the common failure 
that can be noticed on LCD displays, when a pixel stops 
working properly and it appears as a black spot on the screen. 
The single broken pixel may not preclude the good 
interpretation of the captured images by the AI/ML 
applications, despite a deliberately modified pixel may 
actually do so [39]. However, several dead pixels (e.g., a limit 
case is in Figure 4f) have higher chances to drop the accuracy 
of the AI/ML application that uses the image. The dead pixel 
failure manifests in the image sensor. 
Dirty Internal - Dirty External. These two failures 
(Figure 4g) can be discussed together, as they both concern 
debris of various kinds and sizes (most typically, dust and dirt) 
which deposits on the internal or external lenses [72]. The 
most significant difference between the two lenses is that the 
external dirt can be removed, usually by cleaning the first lens 
of the objective (i.e., the most external lens). Instead, 
removing the internal dirt requires more time and, sometimes, 
specialized personnel [44]. Dirty-related failures manifest in 
the lens component. 
Electrical Overload. The excessive and dangerous 
temperature increase of the conductors due to an electrical 
overload could damage, and most likely break, the electronical 
parts in the camera body. A device with this generic electrical 
problem may stop working or find itself in a state where 
images cannot be processed [44]; as effect, the images are 
produced incorrectly or, most likely, not produced at all. 
Electrical overload may manifest in the camera body. 
Flare. The structure itself of the lenses group creates flare. 
Flare is due to the reflection of the sun or other light sources 
on the lenses. The resulting image shows spots of various 
colors, usually more than one and concentrated on an 
imaginary line. Obviously, these spots can cover details in the 
images: the subsequent processing steps, even if the image is 
captured correctly, will be influenced by the presence of these 
spots. Flare is difficult to eliminate completely also with the 
modern technology, that sets a series of lenses slightly spaced 
one from each other, and each with a specific task. Flare 
failure manifests in the lens component. 
Heat. This type of failure relates to the heat that the lens 
or camera body can suffer in their operational life. In extreme 
cases, excessive heat could lead to the evaporation of the 
lubricating liquids of the moving parts (e.g., zoom). As a 
result, the use of the zoom (if present) and of other sub-
components that are intended to make the image as clear as 
possible (e.g., the focus tools) may be precluded. As for 
Brackish/Salt-Water, the image may be altered in various 
ways and we refer to the description of all the other failures 
effects for a complete characterization of heat effects. The 
heat failure manifests in the lens and camera body. 
Ice. Ice can be the cause of several camera malfunctions. 
In fact, this can break the external materials of camera lens 
and camera body. Furthermore, the external lens can be 
covered with a blanket of ice that prevents the acquisition of 
images (Figure 4h). The Ice failure manifests in the lens and 
the camera body. 
No Action. A failed ISP does not respond and therefore 
the processing of the acquired image does not take place: the 
image remains in raw format, without any type of processing. 
As effect, the camera does not transmit anything to the other 
processing components of the vehicle. This failure manifests 
in the ISP. 
No Bayer Filter. With this failure we want to highlight 
that, without a Bayer Filter properly functioning, the produced 
image would result in wrong colors (Figure 4i; wrong colors, 
in this case, mean that greyscale images are produced). The 
following phases would unavoidably process chromatically-
wrong images. This failure manifests in the Bayer filter. 
No Chromatic Aberration Correction - Incomplete 
Chromatic Aberration Correction. This failure refers to the 
case that the ISP fails to (fully or partially) apply the removal 
of chromatic aberration on the acquired image. In optics, axial 
chromatic aberration is a defect in the formation of the image, 
due to the different refractive values of the light wavelengths 
that passes through the optical instrument [67]. It is a defect 
which may affect all optical lens systems, to varying degrees. 
This failure leads to images with colored halos on the edges of 
the subjects: the images show "fringes" of various colors 
(mostly purple) and a sort of general blur (Figure 4j). This 
failure manifests in the ISP. 
No Demosaicing - Incomplete Demosaicing. In No 
Demosaicing, we consider the case in which the image is 
acquired in RAW format (Figure 4k). This means that the 
demosaicing process has not been carried out and therefore the 
image is presented with each pixel containing a red, green or 
blue value. In this case the Bayer array has not yet been 
interpreted and the image is more pixelated than normal. The 
prevalence of the greenish hue, also visible in Figure 4k, is due 
to the high percentage of green photosites (it is double the 
percentage of the red and blue photosites) in the Bayer filter, 
as visible in Figure 2. This failure manifests in the ISP. 
No Lens Distortion Correction - Incomplete Lens 
Distortion Correction. This failure may affect only vehicles 
which mount cameras with wide-angle lenses [21], [73], 
which tend to deform the image. In fact, with these lenses, the 
captured image appears as mapped around a sphere that is 
more protruding towards the observer, in the center of the 
image. If the conversion to normal proportions (natural 
symmetric) is not successful, the image may freeze in this 
processing phase and the system may be in a stalled state. 
Alternatively, if the output image is incorrectly processed, the 
AI/ML applications may use images with surrounding objects 
of distorted proportions and shapes. This failure manifests in 
the ISP. 
No Noise Reduction - Incomplete Noise Reduction. The 
device captures the image, but during the processing phases 
(noise reduction) there is an error that prevents the correct 
removal of the noise e.g., Figure 4l. This failure manifests in 
the ISP. 
No Sharpness - Incomplete Sharpness. In this case, the 
processing of the captured images fails during the sharpness 
correction phase. This affects the ability of a camera to 
identify and define the separation limit between two 
contiguous areas that have different brightness and/or color 
(Figure 5, left side). This failure manifests in the ISP.  
Rain. It refers to the case in which there are small spots on 
the camera lens, mostly white, due to the deposit of water 
drops on the external lens [72] (Figure 5, right side). The 
elimination of these stains can be considered trivial when the 
vehicle is parked and without rainfall. However, given the 
weather variability that a vehicle can encounter, we cannot 
only consider such simple case. This failure manifests in the 
lens. 
Sand. Because of sand, there may be a possible corrosion 
of the external sub-components of the lens (percentage of salt 
in the sand), with the consequent introduction of external 
agents inside the device, and to the extent that the camera may 
not capture exact images. In fact, sand could block 
subcomponents which have the purpose of making the image 
as clear as possible (tools for focusing, zooming, etc.). The 
effect on the output image is similar to Dirty Internal-External. 
This failure manifests in the lens and camera body. 
Spots. This failure occurs when small particles of dust (or 
other type of material) settle on the Image Sensor. This deposit 
means that small spots, or shadows, are visible above the light 
colors on the output image. Such shadows are mostly circular 
in shape and are very common for amateur photography, 
particularly when using multiple lenses. In fact, while 
operating on the camera for maintenance, external agents of 
imperceptible size may enter and settle on the exposed Image 
Sensor [74]. The failure effect is similar to the Dirty Internal-
External in Figure 4g. This failure manifests in the image 
sensor. 
Water. If water enters the lens or the camera body, the 
electrical components can fail and most likely no longer 
acquire images, or acquire them without any content [72]. This 
failure manifests in the lens and camera body. 
Wind. We consider those parts of the component with 
cavities that, due to the force of the wind (while the vehicle is 
in motion or parked), could lead to minimal external damage 
and the subsequent infiltration of various agents inside the 
camera. The acquisition of images could therefore be 
incorrect: lenses could move and images shifted or cut, etc. 
This can be considered very rare for a vehicle camera. This 
failure manifests in the lens and camera body. 
B. Summary of the Analysis 
Table I recaps the failures model and the involved camera 
components. An acronym is matched to each failure; it will be 
used in the rest of the paper. Further, we add a discussion on 
possible mitigations implementable in the camera. 
IV. FAILURES INJECTION AND TEST CAMPAIGN  
To better understand the effects and the safety risk of the 
identified failures, we reproduce them in software and we 
inject them in the vehicle camera of an autonomous driving 
simulator. All the code we developed is available at [9]. 
A. Autonomous Driving with Carla simulator 
We opt for the Open Urban Driving Simulator Carla (Car 
Learning to Act, [1]) to create a vehicle that is autonomously 
driving in a town using the camera as its unique input sensor.  
Carla has been implemented as an open-source layer over 
the Unreal Engine 4 (UE4, [2]) to support training, 
prototyping, and validation of autonomous driving models, 
including both perception and control. Carla includes urban 
layouts, several vehicle models, buildings, pedestrians, street 
signs, etc. The simulation platform supports flexible setup of 
sensor suites, and in particular we will exploit the camera 
sensor, that allows acquiring images from the frontal camera 
of the vehicle at a specified Frame Per Second (FPS) rate.  In 
the fixed-time step simulation mode that we will use, the FPS 
determines the temporal duration of each simulation step; we 
set FPS=10 i.e., a simulation step corresponds of 100 
milliseconds of simulated time. Carla provides information on 
the simulated vehicles as position, orientation, speed, 
acceleration, collisions and traffic violations. Weather 
conditions and time of day can also be specified. 
 
  
Figure 5. Output frames of the frontal camera for No Sharpness - Incomplete 
Sharpness (left) and Rain (right) failures. 
Amongst the various autonomous driving agents that exist 
for Carla, we use the trained agent from [3]. Technical details 
on the trained agent are outside the scope of this paper and are 
reported in [3]; we introduce only the notions required to 
illustrate our test plan. Using this trained agent, at each 
simulation step it is acquired: i) one RGB image from the 
frontal camera of the vehicle at a resolution of 384 × 160 
pixels, and ii) the current speed from the speed sensor. These 
values are processed by the trained agent to predict waypoints 
in the camera coordinates, and then these waypoints are 
projected into the vehicle’s coordinate image [3]. In simpler 
words, the trained agent “designs” a trajectory composed of 
five waypoints on the image. From this, a low-level controller 
is executed that decides the steering angle, the throttle level, 
and the braking force. Finally, throttle, speed and braking are 
applied on the vehicle. 
We selected this trained agent amongst the various 
available because: i) the code is compliant with the latest Carla 
0.9 release; ii) it uses only the camera as sensing system, while 
the usage of additional Carla sensors as depth camera or lidar 
would invalidate the objectives of our simulations; iii) it 
presents very good performances such that it is, to the best of 
our knowledge, currently the most performing model for 
autonomous driving in Carla using only the camera, showing 
a minimal number of vehicle collisions; and iv) it has easy-to-
use suites for benchmarking, data retrieval and data analysis, 
including recording of videos of the simulations, and a fix to 
Carla 0.9.6 to support pedestrian crossing. Further, the model 
was trained with image augmentations following [8], 
including pixel dropout, blurring, Gaussian noise, and color 
perturbations which partially overlap with our failures model. 
We preferred a self-driving agent over an object 
recognition agent, that is instead typically used in works 
discussing images quality [33], [35], [36], [37]. In fact, a self-
driving agent allows showing the effect of persistent failures 
on consequential images and actions, rather than on individual 
images without a continuous context. 
B. Injection strategy and failure implementation 
Our injection strategy consists of the following actions, 
performed at each simulation step: i) acquire the output image 
from the camera; ii) modify the image by injecting the selected 
failure before the trained agent processes the image; and iii) 
feed the modified image to the trained agent. This can be 
realized by modifying the code of the simulator: in a method 
called carla_img_to_np, the simulator extracts the image from 
the vehicle’s camera before sending it to the decision and 
control parts. In this method, the simulated failures 
(implemented in Python) were injected. 
TABLE I. FAILURES MODEL, ACRONYMS, FAILURES APPORTIONMENT TO THE CAMERA COMPONENTS, AND DISCUSSION ON MITIGATIONS. 
 
Failure name Acronym Comp. Identified mitigations 
Black BLA 
LE
N
S 
Black, white (and brightness) alterations can be detected easily, but it is difficult to recover the image (aside 
brightness, which can be corrected to a certain extent at post-processing). White WHI 
Blurred BLUR 
Various methods of removing or correcting image blurring exist [45], [46]. For example, Cai et al. [45] 
formulates the blind blurring as a new joint optimization problem, which simultaneously maximizes the sparsity 
of the blur kernel and the sparsity of the clear image. 
Broken lens BRLE A broken lens may be detected through image processing, but it may be difficult to re-create a clean image. 
Broken VR BRVR Methods similar to blur removal [45], [46] are applicable for this failure. 
Dirty external DIRTY Image processing solutions can remove localized rain and dirt effects from a single image [48]. For example, physics-based methods [47] can remove dust and dirt effects from digital photographs and videos.  Dirty internal 
Flare FLA Lens artifacts like lens flare and ghosting can be reduced or removed at post-processing [49] from a single input image to restore the correct image. 
Rain RAIN For the mitigation of this failure, we refer to the same observations of DIRTY and to [48]. 
Condensation COND 
LE
N
S-
CA
M
ER
A
 B
O
D
Y
 Various works e.g., [50], [51], [52], address the problem of avoiding or removing condensation inside cameras. 
Heat HEAT Against desert and very cold temperatures, there are commercial solutions such as the video surveillance camera AXIS Q60-C PTZ [28] that meets the military standard MIL-STD-810G [60]. 
Sand SAND This failure needs to be prevedented with proper casing of the camera. 
Ice ICE Camera devices to heat lenses [53] prevent or at least reduce condensation of moisture. 
Water WAT This failure needs to be prevedented with proper casing of the camera. 
Brackish/Salt-water BRAC Approaches exist specifically to prevent corrosion of the surfaces in contact with seawater, brackish water, or fresh water [54]. 
Wind WIND 
These failures need to be prevented e.g., with proper casing of the camera, reliable control circuits and reliable 
sensors. 
Electrical overload ELOVER 
No Bayer filter NBAYF BAYER FILTER 
Spots SPO 
SE
N
SO
R
 
Many image processing methods remove blemishes e.g., Zamfir et al. [55] detect blemishes and compute their 
physical appearance (size, shape, position and transparency) in an image as a function of camera settings, while 
Steinberg et  al. [56] process images to automatically correct dust.  
Banding BAND There are various ways to reduce visual effects of banding e.g., by applying dithering patterns [59]. 
Bright lines BRIGLI This failure is generally mitigated by the current knowledge and technology, and it is now rare. 
Dead pixel DEAPIX 
It is possible to detect dead pixels without complicated mathematic computations, so that the detection method 
can be implemented in the embedded device [57]. Circuits to correct dead pixels can be fabricated on a single 
integrated chip [58]. 
No action NOACT 
IS
P 
It may be easy to detect this failure at system level, but it is not possible to recover the image. 
No chrom. aber-
ration correction 
NOCHROM
AB Chromatic aberration effects can be reduced e.g., with image processing [22], [67]. 
No demosaicing NODEMOS Several efficient ways for demosaicing exist as [61], [62]; however it is difficult to recover the image in case of demosaicing failure. 
No lens distortion 
correction NOLENDIS Lens distortion can be measured and detected [65], and it can be corrected with image processing [64], [66]. 
No noise reduction NONOISE Several solutions to reduce or remove noise and sharpness are available, also in commercial tools. Solutions 
that operate at sensor-level also exist e.g., [63], [29]. No sharpness correction NOSHARP 
 
 
In Table II we report implementation details of the 
simulated failures, including the 31 configurations we will 
simulate. First, it can be observed that some failures have 
different intensities levels or configurations. For example, the 
White failure may have different brightness intensities, from 
the addition of a mild brightness up to the totally white image: 
consequently, we considered multiple configurations of the 
White failure (BRIGH1, BRIGH2, WHI in Table II). Further, 
it should be noted that some failures alter the image in a 
similar way: this allowed grouping failures that have similar 
effects on the output image. This applies to the Blurred and 
the Broken VR failures (we will consider only the first one, 
from now on), and to the Dirty Internal-Dirty External and 
Spots failures (again, we will consider only the first one). We 
ignore failures whose effect is either i) not providing an output 
image (Electrical Overload, No Action, Water), or ii) not 
univocally determined (Brackish/Salt-Water, Heat, Sand). We 
exclude Bright Lines and Wind as we believe they are very 
rare for vehicles camera. We exclude also Flare as it depends 
on the sun position and it needs to take into account vehicle 
movements, requiring environmental data; further, it would 
overlap with the flare effects already represented in the Carla 
simulator. Finally, we don’t apply the No Lens Distortion 
because we are not using a wide-angle lens in Carla. 
C. Test plan and execution 
The test plan is based on the corl2017 benchmark from [1]. 
This benchmark is composed of multiple runs in which a 
target vehicle must reach a destination position B from a 
starting position A before a timeout expires. The timeout value 
is the time required to cover the distance from A to B at an 
average speed of 10 Km/h as in [1], [3]. Re-using the 
nomenclature from [1], the starting position A and the 
destination position B are selected such that three test 
objectives are set: 
- Straight road: Destination position B is located straight 
ahead of the starting position A. 
- Turn road: Destination position B is one turn away from 
the starting position A. 
TABLE II. IMPLEMENTATION AND CONFIGURATION OF THE SIMULATED FAILURES. 
 
Failures Implementation details Configurations (named as: failure acronym+configuration identifier) 
Banding We use the PIL Image Module [12] and the images in [9] 
BAND: we use resize() and blend() methods to superimpose an image (available at [9]) 
representing banding 
Black We set every pixel black with the Module Image of PIL [12] BLA: via the PIL load method, making each pixel black 
White 
(brightness) 
Brightness introduced using the PIL 
Image and ImageEnhance Modules [12] 
BRIGH1: using ImageEnhance.Brightness(img) with factor 1.5 
BRIGH2: using ImageEnhance.Brightness(img) with factor 2.5 
WHI: via the PIL load method, we make each pixel white 
Blurred 
(and Broken VR) Blur introduced using cv2 [11] BLUR: we set cv2.blur(img,(12,12)) 
Broken Lens 
Failures are simulated using the PIL 
Image Module [12] and different images 
of broken lens, dirt, rain drops, 
condensation, ice on lens available at [9]. 
These images are superimposed to the 
frame acquired by the vehicle camera. 
BRLE1, BRLE2: we use PIL resize and blend methods to superimpose two different images 
of broken lens 
Condensation COND: we use PIL resize and blend methods to superimpose an image representing condensation on lens  
Dirty internal / 
Dirty external 
(and Spots) 
DIRTY1, DIRTY2: we use PIL resize and blend methods to superimpose two different 
images representing dirt on lens. 
Ice ICE1, ICE2: we use PIL resize and blend methods to superimpose two different transparent images an image representing ice on lens 
Rain RAIN: we use PIL resize and blend methods to superimpose an image representing water drops on the lens 
Dead pixel We change the color channel and image processing with cv2  [11] 
DEAPIX1: we consider a single black pixel introduced at the bottom right of the frame 
DEAPIX50: we consider 50 black pixels introduced as a grid (5 vertical x 10 horizontal) 
DEAPIX200: we consider 200 black pixels introduced as a grid (10 vertical x 20 horizontal) 
DEAPIX1000: we consider 1000 black pixels introduced as a grid (25 vertical x 40 
horizontal) 
DEAPIX-vcl: we consider a single vertical line, composed of adjacent black pixels, in the 
center of the view of the camera mounted on the vehicle 
DEAPIX-3l: we consider 3 lines formed by adjacent black pixels of which 2 are horizontal 
and 1 is vertical 
DEAPIX-5l: we consider 5 lines formed by adjacent black pixels of which 3 are horizontal 
and 2 are vertical 
DEAPIX-10l: we consider 10 lines formed by adjacent black pixels of which 5 are 
horizontal and 5 are vertical 
DEAPIX-r: we consider 2 oblique lines that may overlap with the straight track (Figure 3i) 
DEAPIX-ro: we consider 2 oblique lines as in DEAPIX-r and a small block of black pixels 
in the center (which may be interpreted as an obstacle) 
No Bayer filter 
We open and change the color channel of 
the image with cv2  [11] and convert to a 
grayscale with PIL Image Module [12] 
NBAYF: open with cv2.imread(img), change color channel with cv2.cvtColor(img, 
cv2.COLOR_BGR2RGB) and converted with .convert('LA') method to obtain the grey-scale 
image 
No chromatic 
aberration 
correction 
Image processing with PIL Image 
Module [12], numPy [13] and [68]  
NOCHROMAB-b, NOCHROMAB-nb: we introduce the effect of Chromatic Aberration 
through the code in  [68] respectively with and without blur 
No demosaicing We process the image with cv2  [11], and resize with PIL Image Module [12] 
NODEMOS: cv2.imread(img) to read image, elaboration, imgOut.resize((h,w), 
Image.ANTIALIAS) to resize the final image 
No noise 
reduction 
Speckle noise is introduced using cv2  
[11] and numPy [13] 
NONOISE1: in the np.random.normal method we set the three parameters as follows: 0, 0.5, 
img.size; then np.random.normal(0,0.5,img.size) 
NONOISE2: in the np.random.normal method we set the three parameters as follows: 0, 1, 
img.size; then np.random.normal(0,1,img.size) 
No sharpness 
correction 
Sharpness is introduced using the PIL 
Image and ImageEnhance Modules [12] NOSHARP: the method ImageEnhance.Sharpness(img) is invoked with factor -3.5 
 
 
 
- Navigation: There is no restriction on the location of the 
destination position B relative to the starting position A; 
this results in runs of longer distance and multiple turns. 
 
For each individual run, the success criteria is that the 
destination B is reached before expiration of the timeout. The 
failure criteria is whenever the vehicle collides or the timeout 
expires: we modified the corl2017 benchmark to halt the run 
whenever a collision occurs, as in our work we prioritize 
safety over travelled distance. 
The target town we select is the Carla Town02, that is a 
basic town layout with all "T junctions" and it is also the town 
used for testing trained agent in [3]. Further, we select three 
different weather conditions, that represent a clear noon, a wet 
cloudy noon, and an hard rain sunset. We will call these 
respectively SUNNY, CLOUDYWET and HARDRAIN in 
what follows. In addition, in each of the runs performed, the 
town includes exactly 50 vehicles and 30 pedestrians. We 
always use the same randomization seed so that spawning 
positions of vehicles and pedestrians are the same in the 
repeated runs. 
The experiments were organized in two phases. In the first 
phase, we performed golden runs to produce clean data i.e., 
we execute the simulation runs without introducing any 
modification in the images captured by the camera. The 
second phase repeats the same runs of the previous phase, but 
with the injection of camera failures to each acquired image. 
Each run begins by setting the failure code within the method 
mentioned above. After that, the Carla server is started, and 
consequently also the Carla client that represents the vehicle 
and produces the run data.  
The three test objectives, with the three weather conditions 
are investigated in 150 runs for the golden runs and for each 
of the injection of all the failures configurations (see Table 
III). This number of runs is a compromise between statistical 
evidence and completion of the experiments in a reasonable 
time. With a total of 4800 individual runs, the simulated time 
in Carla is the equivalent of approximately 160 hours of 
driving. The simulations were executed on an Intel i9-
9920X@3.50GHz CPU with Nvidia Quadro RTX 5000 GPU.  
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON FAILURES RISKS 
We present and discuss results of our test campaign. All 
logs and some videos that describe the various runs are 
available at [10]. 
A. Collisions and success rate 
First, we discuss the impact of each individual failure on 
the decisions of the trained agent of [3]. Figure 6 and Figure 7 
show respectively the success rate and the number of 
collisions for the three test objectives Straight road, Turn road 
and Navigation, ordered by the Navigation test objective. Not 
surprisingly, the golden runs perform the best, with the highest 
success rate (right side of Figure 6) and the lowest number of 
collisions (left side of Figure 7: 4 collisions, all under the 
Navigation test objective). Similar results are achieved by 
DEAPIX1 (5 collisions) and BAND (6 collisions): differences 
from the golden runs are small. In fact, it is credible that 
DEAPIX1 does not affect significantly the trained agent: this 
failure consists in a single black pixel introduced at the bottom 
right of the image and, on top of this, the agent was trained 
with pixel dropouts augmentation. Instead, it is a positive 
surprise that the trained agent is robust to banding i.e., 
horizontal and vertical lines overlaid to the image. On the 
opposite, the failures white (WHI), black (BLA), broken lens 
(BRLE1), ice (ICE2), and blur (BLUR) are the worst 
performing. In fact, these failures significantly modify the 
image. Still, they show some successful runs, and may look 
especially surprising for the Straight road with White and 
Black failures. This is simply because the car is moving 
forward blindly in a straight direction and, if there are no 
obstacles, the run ends successfully. 
 
Figure 6 - Success rate of the three test objectives, for each failure configuration and the golden runs. 
TABLE III. DETAILS ON THE RUNS. 
 
 Test objective Number of runs and weather  
Straight road 
17 runs with weather SUNNY 
17 runs with weather CLOUDYWET 
16 runs with weather HARDRAIN 
Turn road 
17 runs with weather SUNNY 
17 runs with weather CLOUDYWET 
16 runs with weather HARDRAIN 
Navigation 
17 runs with weather SUNNY 
17 runs with weather CLOUDYWET 
16 runs with weather HARDRAIN 
Total 150 runs, repeated for the golden runs and the 
31 configurations in Table II, 3rd column.  
 
 
The remaining failures have variable performances, 
however for each of them the number of collisions is always 
the highest in Navigation and the lowest in Straight road, with 
irrelevant exceptions as DEAPIX-101 where there are 0 
collisions in Turn road and 1 in Straight road. This trend 
matches the results of the golden runs and can be easily 
explained considering the description of the three test 
objectives. 
It should be observed that the ordering of failures in Figure 
6 and Figure 7 is not exactly specular. This is because some 
runs terminate due to the timeout: in general, a timeout occurs 
when the vehicle is unable to decide how to advance after a 
particular event e.g., after hard braking to avoid a vehicle in a 
colliding trajectory. Since this is not leading to collisions, we 
consider that timeouts occur in case of safe failures and we do 
not discuss them further. 
B. Weathers and its effects  
Another relevant argument is the impact of the simulated 
failures under the three different weather conditions, that we 
discuss with the help of Table IV. First, we note that the 
golden runs behave the same under the different weather 
conditions, with 1 collision (out of 17 runs) with SUNNY, 2 
collisions (out of 17 runs) with CLOUDYWET, and 1 
collision (out of 16 runs) with HARDRAIN. 
Table IV shows the five best performing and worst 
performing failures for each weather. These are similar to the 
five best and worst failures in Figure 6, with some interesting 
differences. The Dead Pixel failures are well-mitigated under 
CLOUDYWET weather, with DEAPIX1000, DEAPIX-10l 
and DEAPIX-vcl in the best positions, and DEAPIX1 and 
DEAPIX50 slightly outside the top 5. However, Dead Pixel 
failures are not this good under SUNNY weather. We 
hypothesize that the dead pixels with the cloudy sky of 
CLOUDYWET do not confuse the trained agent. 
Another interesting observation is that BRIGH2 with 
SUNNY performs much worse than in CLOUDYWET and 
HARDRAIN: the images being acquired in CLOUDYWET 
and HARDRAIN are rather dark, and adding brightness have 
reduced negative effects with respect to adding brightness on 
a SUNNY weather. It is on the opposite behavior ICE1, which 
shows 3 failures under SUNNY, and the remaining 22 failures 
with CLOUDYWET and HARDRAIN. 
C. Safety risks and summary of results 
It is evident that our results depend on the target 
application, and consequently an univocal definition of failure 
criticalities and risks cannot be devised. However, important 
concluding observations can be defined. Section V.A brings 
evidence that the represented failures shouldn’t be ignored 
when building image-based autonomous driving systems and 
applications. In fact, we show that failures with small visual 
 
Figure 7 - Number of collisions in the three test objectives, for each failure configuration and the golden runs. 
TABLE IV -  THE FIVE FAILURES LEADING TO THE LEAST AND MOST 
COLLIDING RUNS UNDER THREE DIFFERENT WEATHERS. 
 SUNNY CLOUDYWET HARDRAIN 
Golden runs 1.96 % 3.92 % 2,08 % 
Least colliding runs: percentage of collisions 
SUNNY 
1.96 % 
DEAPIX1 
DEAPIX50 
DIRTY1 
3.92 %  BAND 
5.88 % ICE1 
CLOUDYWET 
1.96 % 
DEAPIX1000 
DEAPIX-10l 
DEAPIX-vcl 
3.92 % BAND NBAYF 
HARDRAIN 
2.08 % DEAPIX1 DEAPIX200 
4.17 % 
BAND 
NBAYF 
NONOISE1 
Most colliding runs: percentage of collisions 
SUNNY 
98.04 % WHI 
94.12 % BLA 
68.63 % BRIGH2 
47.06 % BLUR 
33.33 % NONOISE2 
CLOUDYWET 
96.08 % WHI 
94.12 % BLA 
62.75 % BLUR 
35.29 % COND 
33.33 % NONOISE2 
HARDRAIN 
95.83 % WHI 
93.75 % BLA 
60.42 % BLUR 
35.42 % NONOISE2 
27.08 % COND 
 
 
effects affect the decisions of the trained agent. Even small 
problems, for example the DEAPIX50 failure that scatters 50 
dead pixels on a camera with a resolution of 384 × 160 (above 
60.000 pixels), can generate images that deceive the trained 
agent. Further, from Section V.B we conclude that the safety 
risk associated to a failure also depends on the environmental 
conditions: the impact of some failures varies significantly 
depending on the natural light and the color of the sky. 
VI. RELATED WORKS 
To the best of our knowledge, no research works discuss a 
complete failures model of a vehicle camera, including an 
analysis of effects and safety risks, and the provision of a 
software library. However, several works dealt with similar or 
inherent problems. 
The performance, robustness, and security of an RGB 
camera have been widely explored, however usually focusing 
on specific elements or target metrics and without addressing 
the full set of failures. For example, Bijelic et al. [25] present 
a test and evaluation methodology to compare sensor 
technologies: the paper shows the difference between an 
image captured by a standard CMOS camera and one captured 
by a gated camera. Schops et al. [26], motivated by the 
limitations of existing multi-view stereo camera benchmarks 
(a stereo camera has two or more lenses, each with a separate 
image sensor: this allows the device to simulate binocular 
human vision and capture three-dimensional images [34]), 
introduce a new dataset and a technique to minimizes the 
photometric errors. In [32] a simulation environment is 
presented which includes the virtual structures of a car 
designed for autonomous driving tests; typical driving 
situations have been used to analyze how sensors respond 
when used in real circumstances as well as to confirm the 
impacts of environmental conditions. Considering instead 
sensor security issues, Petit et al. [19] blind a commercial 
camera system used in commercial vehicles with several light 
sources. The work shows that leveraging a laser or LED 
matrix could blind the camera. Similarly, Yan et al. [34] 
successfully blind the camera by aiming the LED and the laser 
light at the camera directly: radiating a laser beam against a 
camera of a vehicle may cause irreversible damage and disrupt 
the corresponding autonomous applications. In general, it is 
observed that, because of the vulnerability of the camera 
caused by its optical characteristics, it is difficult to build a 
completely secure camera system [18]. 
In the domain of image-based AI/ML algorithms and 
applications, many works acknowledge that the risk of 
accidental alterations of the output image of the camera is 
realistic e.g., [47]. However, this consideration is usually 
ancillary to the main contribution of the work. Nonetheless, 
works in the AI/ML domain strongly helped us refining and 
cross-checking the completeness of our failures model. In fact, 
chromatic aberration, noise, color temperature, blur and 
brightness alteration are often considered in image-based 
AI/ML trained agents, although for the scope of data 
augmentation during training [30]. For example, Toromanoff 
et al. [31] present a new convolutional neural networks (CNN) 
model, in which label augmentation based on translation and 
rotation allows generating data using only a short-range 
fisheye (wide angle) camera. Menze et al. [23] elaborate a new 
model and data set for 3D scene flow estimation, and 
explicitly take advantage of the background movement caused 
by the camera mounted on a vehicle. Behzadan et al. [24] 
show a new deep reinforcement learning framework; in order 
to develop robust sensors and algorithms, testing under certain 
meteorological conditions is deemed crucial for determining 
the impact of bad weather on sensors.  
Several other works instead focused on security and 
robustness of the trained agents that contribute to the 
autonomous driving system, trying to understand the possible 
modification of camera images that could be produced by an 
attacker, or to define corner cases. Attackers may maliciously 
alter the images with transformations that are similar, in 
concept, to those that could happen with non-malicious 
failures: also these works were useful when devising our 
failures model. Most relevant, K. Pei et al. [35] apply input 
space reduction techniques to transform the image, and can 
simulate a wide range of real-world distortions, noises, and 
deformations. W. Wu et al. [36] present a faults model for 
deep neural networks classifiers, which includes several 
corner cases based on the alteration of the input image, 
including amongst the possible causes  brightness, camera 
alignment, and object movements. Finally, evasion attacks 
consist in modifying the input to a classifier such that it is 
misclassified, while keeping the modification as small as 
possible [37]. For example, to create such adversarial images, 
the correct images can be modified by overlaying carefully 
crafted noise [38], or altering few selected pixel [39], or with 
rotation and translation [40]. A representative list of such 
evasion attacks and their implementations is available at [37]. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Several works acknowledge the possibility that camera 
images are accidentally or intentionally modified before they 
are used by an autonomous driving application. However, to 
our knowledge, a clear definition of a camera failures model 
and a software fault library for failures reproduction are still 
missing. These would benefit software and system engineers 
that can rely on a reference model to assess robustness of their 
autonomous driving applications and systems. This paper 
discussed the failures model identified through the application 
of an FMEA and literature review on a vehicle camera; the 
discussion is complemented with the identification of 
potential mitigations, and with a public library that can be used 
to reproduce the failures on images sets. Further, we injected 
such failures in an autonomous driving simulator, to 
understand their impact on image-based AI/ML applications. 
Even if results are application-dependent, it is clear that even 
failures that slightly perturb the image may impact the 
decisions of a trained agent. Further, it was interesting to 
observe that the safety risk associated to camera failures 
depends also on the environmental conditions: for some 
failures, the number of collisions were closely related to the 
weather conditions. 
We are planning different further works. First, we are 
defining a failure detector that can identify incorrect images. 
We are currently training an agent to recognize failed images, 
such that it can alert the driving system. Second, we are 
developing an interactive tool to facilitate the usage of the 
software library. Third, we will exercise such tool on multiple 
trained agents and automotive datasets: the goal is to compare 
the effects of camera failures in different image-based 
autonomous driving applications, including agents trained 
with data augmentation approaches. 
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